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Abstract​: The free energy principle (FEP) purports to provide a single principle for the 
organizational dynamics of living systems, including their cognitive profiles. It states that for 
a system to maintain non-equilibrium steady-state with its environment it must minimise its 
free energy. It is said to be entirely scale-free, applying to anything from particles to 
organisms, and interactive machines, spanning from the abiotic to the biotic. Because the FEP 
is so general in its application, it is for this reason that one might wonder in what sense this 
framework captures anything specific to biological characteristics, if details at all. We take 
steps to correct for this here. We do so by taking up a distinct challenge that the FEP must 
overcome if it is to be of interest to those working in the biological sciences. We call this ​the 
pebble challenge​: it states that the FEP cannot capture the organisational principles specific 
to biology, for its formalisms apply equally well to pebbles. We progress in solving the 
pebble challenge by articulating how the notion of ‘autonomy as precarious operational 
closure’ from the enactive literature can be unpacked within the FEP. This enables the FEP to 
delineate between the abiotic and the biotic; avoiding the pebble challenge that keeps it out of 
touch with the living systems we encounter in the world and is of interest to the sciences of 
life and mind. 
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1 Introduction 
The free energy principle (FEP) is a principle first approach to the organizational dynamics 
essential to life.  It seeks to provide a general theory unifying biology and cognitive science 1
formulated almost entirely from mathematical principles in physics and machine learning 
(see e.g., Friston 2010 2013; Hohwy 2020; Kirchhoff et al. 2018; Linson et al. 2018; 
Ramstead et al. 2019). Its ambition is to secure a formulation of systems that are in 
non-equilibrium steady-state with their environments by appealing to constructs in physics 
and machine learning, and then employing those constructs to derive an explanation of 
self-organisation and biological cognition within the same framework (Friston 2019; Hesp et 
al. 2019).  2
Under the FEP, for a system to maintain non-equilibrium steady-state with its environment it 
must minimise its free energy. Free energy is a notion that stems from statistical physics. 
Under the FEP, it denotes a quantity that reflects the likelihood of sensory input (or 
outcomes) conditioned on a model of how that input was generated. This is the same as 
saying that for a system to exist it must minimise the negative log probability of a distribution 
over its sensory outcomes, because doing so is equivalent to reducing surprise (where average 
surprise is entropy). In this information-theoretic formulation, free energy is formulated as an 
upper bound on surprise conditioned on the average or expected configuration of states of a 
system in a state space. Crucially, for a self-organising system that is in non-equilibrium 
steady-state with its environment there are two ways variational free energy can be 
minimised. The system’s configuration could be changed, so as to change how it acts in (or 
‘samples’) its environment; or, one could update the bound of expected states in the state 
space. These channels by which a biological agent can minimise free energy can be taken as 
mathematical descriptions of action and perception, respectively, resulting in a view of 
adaptive self-organisation characteristic of biological systems.   3
1 Principle first means that the approach starts from essential principles, as opposed to a bottom-up approach in 
which a definition of life is filtered out of the study of actual living systems. 
2 The term ‘non-equilibrium steady-state’ refers to ​self-sustaining​ processes in a system requiring input and 
output to avoid relaxing into ​thermodynamic equilibrium​ (= systemic decay/death). It is important to mention 
here that the notion ‘steady-state’ in non-equilibrium systems is an approximation to some specified duration of 
time - e.g., circadian rhythms over a 24 hour clock cycle or the homeostatic processes involved in maintaining 
on average and over time a specific body temperature. So strictly speaking, biological systems are not in steady 
states; rather, to say that a system is in a steady-state, ​X​, at a particular time, is effectively to say that the average 
of the system’s states during some period of time was​ X​. 
3 It would be natural to object that this kind of information-theoretic treatment of biology and cognition is too 
general to pick out the details of biological and cognitive characteristics. It is however important to bear in mind 
that the FEP is “not a rigorous treatment [of this relationship and their specific dynamics of biology and 
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The FEP not only seeks to derive a formulation of biological self-organisation; it is said to be 
entirely scale-free in its applicability. That is, it is intended to apply to any system able to 
maintain its organisation despite tendencies towards disorder: from chemotaxis in cells 
(Friston 2013; Auletta 2013), neuronal signalling in brains (Friston et al. 2017; Parr & Friston 
2019), tropism in plants (Calvo & Friston 2017), synchronised singing in birds (Frith & 
Friston 2015) to decision-making and planning in mammals (Daunizeau et al. 2010; Friston 
2013; Williams 2018). It has also been applied to model adaptive fitness over evolutionary 
timescales by casting evolution in terms of Bayesian model optimisation and selection 
(Campbell 2016; Hesp et al. 2019). However, this widespread applicability of the FEP can be 
taken as a fault, rather than an advantage. 
Indeed, there is a general concern about the FEP’s ability to speak to the essential 
organizational dynamics of biology, because it can seem utterly disconnected from biology. 
More specifically, the FEP is sometimes considered incapable of uniquely addressing the 
organisational dynamics of living systems (van Es 2020; Colombo and Wright 2018). 
Because the FEP implies an entirely scale-free dynamics in which any self-organising 
(non-equilibrium steady-state) system can be cast in terms of self-evidencing, some worry 
that this particular view cannot capture the specific details of biological organisation that is of 
interest to the biological sciences. This is a serious issue, for if true it undercuts the grand 
unifying ambitions of the FEP.  
We address this worry here. Our plan is as follows. We start by rehearsing the basic tenets of 
the FEP, with particular focus on the Markov blanket formalism and how it relates to 
Bayesian inference (sect. 2). We proceed to explicate the above mentioned worry by taking 
up a challenge that the FEP must overcome if it is to fulfill its ambitions in biology. We have 
dubbed this the pebble challenge (sect. 3): it states that the FEP cannot capture the 
organisational principles specific to biology, for its formalisms apply equally well to pebbles. 
Indeed, the FEP applies to all open dynamical systems ranging from bacteria, plants and 
humans to fires, hurricanes and pebbles. This makes it unable to carve any interesting joints 
between the abiotic and the biotic. Kirchhoff et al. (2018) make an initial attempt to address 
this problem, suggesting that autonomy is what distinguishes living from non-living systems. 
The overarching claim there is that autonomy is the capacity of a system to modulate its 
relationship to its environment. In addressing the pebble challenge, we supplement this initial 
treatment. We do this by sketching the contours of how the notion of ‘autonomy’ from the 
enactive literature could be emulated with the tools available to the FEP formalisms. This 
allows us to understand what constitutes an autonomous system rather than merely using the 
notion of autonomy as a mark by which to delineate life from no-life (sect. 4).  
cognition, respectively], but a series of heuristics that provide an interesting perspective on how biological 
systems might function.” (Friston & Stephan 2007, p. 418)  
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2 Markov blankets, free energy and Bayesian inference 
The FEP speaks to what characteristics a system must exhibit for it to exist (Friston 2013). Its 
basic premise is that any random dynamical system “that possesses a Markov blanket will 
appear to actively maintain its structural and dynamical integrity” (Friston 2013, p. 2). 
A Markov blanket is a statistical separation of states that is applicable to any thing that exists 
(Friston 2019). It is a set of blanket states that separates a system’s internal states from 
external states (Pearl, 1988; Beal 2003). The blanket states shield (in a statistical sense) 
internal from external states, and vice versa. They can be partitioned into sensory states and 
active states. Sensory states capture the influence of external states on internal states. Active 
states capture the influence of internal states on external states. Intuitively, any thing can be 
separated statistically from that which it is not (Palacios et al. 2020).  
Figure 1​ is a schematic representation of a Markov blanketed system. The gray 
circle delineates the Markov blanketed system that separates internal states 
(int) from external states (ext). The blanket states, sensory states (sen) and 
active states (act) are displayed as surrounding the internal states. The arrows 
depict modes of influence. External states influence only one another or 
sensory states, while influenced only by active states or one another. Internal 
states are influenced only by sensory states, influencing only active states. In 
terms of modes of influence, internal states are separated from external states. 
(figure taken from Bruineberg, et al. 2018). 
In this statistical formulation, the separation between internal and external states implies that 
these states are ​conditionally independent​, given​ ​the states that comprise the Markov blanket. 
That is, if we, say, want to know the external states and we know the values of the blanket 
states, knowing the values of the internal states will not offer additional predictive value, and 
vice-versa. This is so by definition, because the blanket states already capture any possible 
4 
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influence the internal states could have on the external states.  It is a common ​informational 4
partitioning method in solving usually highly advanced statistical problems. This is to say 
that it is not necessarily obvious to associate the boundaries induced by the Markov blanket 
with physical boundaries, though it does lend itself well to this particular application. We 
should thus be wary about overstating the implications of this ​statistical​ partitioning of states 
when considering its application onto other systems (van Es 2019, 2020).  
According to the Second Law of thermodynamics, the ​entropy ​of any closed system increases 
indefinitely over time. Any system that exists, or any Markov blanketed system that retains 
its structural integrity over time, seems to temporarily slow down the increase of entropy for 
as long as it remains intact (Friston 2012, 2013, 2019; Schrödinger, 1944). Of course, any 
such ‘resistance’ is only temporary, as entropy increases upon disintegration, which, in the 
case of biotic systems, means death.  
For any such system, you can establish a multi-dimensional state space with as many 
dimensions as there are variables represented in the state space. Each point in the state space 
corresponds to a unique intersection of values for each variable. In this state space, you can 
mark a bound of states within which a system can remain intact, outside of which it cannot. 
The states within such a bound are called ​attractor states​, the set of which is termed the 
attracting set​ (Friston 2012, 2013). ‘Attracting’ here refers to a sort of ‘pull’ towards the 
particular set of states. For as long as the system remains intact, the system will continuously 
‘revisit’ the states in the attracting set. All this is to say is that the variables of a system that 
remains intact remain within the bounds within which the system remains intact; it’s (nearly) 
tautological. With regards to organisms, the attracting set is different for each species: 
humans remain intact under quite different circumstances than fish do, for example. Insofar 
as this bound counts as a description of the states in which the system can be found when 
alive, it is also considered to be a mathematical description of a phenotype (Friston 2013; 
Kirchhoff et al 2018).  The system is thus, on average and over time, likely to be found 5
within the bound of ‘viable’ states and unlikely to be found outside of it. That is, we may 
expect ​a system to be within a bound of states that it typically remains within ​on average 
(Friston, Wiese, Hobson 2020). This implies a probability distribution (also called the 
recognition density, ​or the ​intrinsic probability density​) that can be laid over the state space 
so that each state is assigned a probability value (Ramstead et al. 2019; Corcoran et al. 2020; 
Friston 2013). At any given time the system is encountered, it is highly likely to occupy a 
state in the attracting set, and highly unlikely to occupy a state outside of this. This means 
4 A brief example may clarify this. Say you observe that it is cold. This could be either due to an open window 
or to an air conditioning system that is set too strong. If you would observe that, say, the air conditioning is set 
excessively high, the observation that it is cold now does not offer further information with regards to whether 
or not the window is open. That is, in this case, the observed cold and the open window are conditionally 
independent, given that the air conditioning is on blast (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019; Beal 2003). In terms of 
the Markov blanket formalism, the observed cold could be cast as the internal states, the state of the window 
could be formalized as the external states with the states of the air conditioning serving as the blanket states. 
This example is important because it indicates the widespread applicability of the formalism. 
5 See Colombo and Wright 2018 for criticism on the viability of this application onto an organismic system. 
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that states within the bound are considered high-probability states, whereas states outside of it 
are considered low-probability states. 
If a system’s internal states remain within a particular range, this must mean that the 
influences on those states are similarly bounded. Consider an egg and spoon race. An 
egg-and-spoon runner will need to ensure that the influence of their running the race on the 
egg remains within certain bounds, lest the egg move out of the spoon and break. Following 
the Markov blanket formalism, the only mode of influencing the internal states is by way of 
sensory states. If we take the internal states here to be the egg’s, and the sensory states the 
influences it receives via the spoon, the runner is here the environment impacting on the 
spoon. This means that an egg-and-spoon runner can be cast as keeping a ​tight bound on the 
sensory states​ of the Markov blanketed egg for as long as it remains in the spoon. As it is for 
the egg-and-spoon runner, so it is for any system that remains intact over time. Relative to the 
attracting set of the internal states of the system, then, we can also establish a state space for 
the sensory states within which the system can remain intact, outside of which it cannot. Here 
too, a probability distribution can be laid over the state space where states within the bound 
are ascribed high probability, those outside of it are ascribed low probability. This probability 
distribution is also called the ​extrinsic probability density​, as it relates to the influences on the 
internal states ​by the external states​. Further, in Bayesian probabilistic theory, ​surprise​ is a 
quantity defined as the ​improbability​ of a particular state (Shannon, 1948). If the surprise of 
sensory states (or ‘sensory surprise’, not to be confused with agent-level surprise with regards 
to an unexpected sensation) is high, the sensory states currently occupy a low probability area 
in the state space. As low-probability states are those that endanger the system’s structural 
integrity, surprise is kept low, or minimized, as long as the system remains intact. However, 
sensory surprise is a probabilistic measure of sensory states. The entire state space of sensory 
states includes all possible modes of influence the external states could possibly exert on the 
internal states. This is, in principle, an infinite set. Computing sensory surprise directly is thus 
intractable (Friston 2009). 
This is where (variational) ​free energy​ comes in. Free energy, in the statistical usage of the 
term, is a functional of the internal and sensory states a system is in.  In this case, free energy 6
is thus, more specifically, the function of a function of the sensory states that is parameterized 
by the internal states. Because of this, the value of free energy limits the possible values of 
the internal and sensory states in quite the same way the solution to a simple multiplication 
problem in arithmetics limits the possible numbers that could have figured in the 
multiplication. Minimizing free energy, then, minimizes an upper bound on sensory states. 
This ensures that sensory states remain in high-probability areas in the state space, which in 
turn implies that sensory surprise is minimized. Minimizing free energy can thus be seen as 
approximately minimizing the otherwise intractable value of sensory surprise (Friston and 
Stephan 2007). Moreover, as free energy is a function of only the internal and sensory states, 
6 A functional is a function of a function. 
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it is in principle tractable to compute (Kiebel, Daunizeau and Friston 2008; Friston and Ao 
2012). 
In Bayesian probability theory, ​negative surprise​ is equivalent to Bayesian model evidence. 
Minimizing​ surprise thus ​maximizes​ Bayesian model evidence. The process by which 
Bayesian model evidence can be maximized is called ​Bayesian inference​ (Friston, Killner, 
Harrison 2006). Bayesian inference then refers to the particular way a probability distribution 
needs to be updated in light of new evidence (Beal 2003). Bayesian inference describes the 
permissible ‘moves’ one can make in the formal system of Bayesian probability theory. The 
FEP typically distinguishes two moves: ​perceptual inference​, which corresponds to updating 
the state space so as to accommodate the novel influences, and ​active inference​, which 
corresponds to prescribing a trajectory through the state space within which the system 
remains within viable bounds. We can now see that for any system to remain intact over time, 
its entropy needs to be minimized on average over time, which means expected free energy 
needs to be minimized, which in turn implies the minimization of sensory surprise, which is 
done by way of a formal operation called Bayesian inference. 
The above story is employed in the FEP as a mathematical description of the homeostatic 
processes of biotic systems (Friston 2013). This works, very roughly, as follows. In the 
Markov blanket formalism, the internal states map onto the organism itself, and the external 
states map onto the environment. The partitioning blanket states map onto the organism’s 
modes of interaction so that sensory states are associated with sensory receptor activity, and 
active states are associated with the system’s influence on its environment, such as action. To 
‘engage’ in Bayesian inference is then considered a fundamental aspect of life. The 
probability distributions are embodied and/or encoded by the organism (and/or the brain). 
They are to be manipulated, updated and leveraged by the organism. Bayesian inference here 
appears in two distinct forms: perceptual inference and active inference. The former simply 
maps onto the organism’s updating of the probability distributions in the face of newfound 
evidence. The latter, however, is considered to be a process by which the organism infers 
action policies for its interaction with the world. Long term activities are thought to require 
counterfactual inference, which is associated with the minimization of ​expected free energy 
or free energy on average over time (Corcoran et al. 2020). Rather than updating the 
probability distribution to remain within the attracting set, this should be seen as the inference 
of a possible trajectory through the state space conditioned on endogenous action. This allows 
for a way for the organism to adapt to environmental fluctuations. After all, the distribution 
of states within which an organism can remain alive cannot be simply ‘updated’ when 
confronted with an environment likely to push the system outside of viable bounds. Active 
inference thus plays a central role in the FEP story of biological systems.   7
7 The extent to which this story should be taken in a realist sense so that each biotic system literally performs 
advanced statistical operations, or in an instrumentalist sense so that each biotic system’s interactional dynamics 
merely correspond to (or ‘instantiate’) the dynamics described in Bayesian inference is still debated (van Es 
7 
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3 The pebble challenge 
One person’s meat is another person’s poison: the scale-free applicability of the FEP’s 
Markov blanket formalism may be taken as a vice, rather than a virtue. In this section we take 
up a specific challenge to the FEP that flows from what seems like an overly generous 
application of the FEP formalism to a wide variety of phenomena: the pebble challenge. It 
challenges the FEP’s ambitions to describe the organizational dynamics of life precisely 
because its mathematical formalisms apply equally well to pebbles, and other abiotic systems 
as they do to biotic ones. One might therefore worry that the FEP fails to say anything 
specific about biology, unless characteristics we take to be specific to biology are not so 
specific at all. We describe this challenge in more detail now.  
Friston & Stephan (2007) anticipates this kind of challenge to the FEP. They ask, “What is 
the difference between a plant [a biotic system] and a stone [an abiotic system]?” (2007, p. 
422) They say that the plant “is an open non-equilibrium system, exchanging matter and 
energy with the environment, whereas the stone is an open system that is largely at 
equilibrium” (2007, p. 422). There is something to this initial observation. Plants are open 
systems, i.e., energy and mass can flow between the system and its surroundings. The same, 
of course, can be said of stones (Olivotos & Economou-Eliopoulos 2016). Crucially, we 
know that variational free energy is a functional of a recognition density parameterised by 
internal states. It is interesting to know that Friston (2013) says that this implies that free 
energy can be expressed as the expected (thermodynamic) free energy minus the entropy 
(surprise) of the ensemble density (2013, p. 4). If free energy can be cast in this 
thermodynamic fashion - then thermodynamic properties of stones can be captured in terms 
of the FEP. Hence, the FEP applies to stones, plants and humans.  
The FEP (as we saw above) starts from the simple observation “that ​for something to exist​ it 
must possess (internal or intrinsic) states that can be separated ​statistically​ from (external or 
extrinsic) states that do not constitute the thing” (Friston 2019, p. 4, emphases added). This is 
the Markov blanket formulation for any locally ergodic system. This would apply to a pebble 
as follows. The Markov blanket defines the conditional independencies between two sets of 
states: the system and the environment. Pebbles are composed of minerals with different 
properties, lattice structure, hardness and cleavage. We can associate these variables as the 
internal states comprising the system. On shingle beaches, the second set of states (the 
environment) would be other pebbles, and so on. In rivers, the water could be cast as the 
external states. As seen in Section 2, it is possible to cast a spatial boundary for anything that 
exists in terms of a Markov blanket (Friston 2013). The pebble has a clear boundary 
separating internal states and external states. The sensory states of a pebble can be associated 
with the effects of external causes of its boundary - stressors such as pressure, temperature 
2020; see Ramstead, Kirchhoff, Friston 2019; Corcoran et al. 2020). A discussion of this debate is outside the 
scope of this paper, and it is unnecessary for our current purposes. 
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and so on. Its active states would correspond to how the pebble effects external states - e.g., 
via release of heat back into the environment. The Markov partitioning rule governing the 
relation between states dictates that external states act on sensory states, which influence, but 
are not themselves influenced by internal states. Internal states couple back to external states, 
via active states, which are not influenced by external states (Palacios et al. 2020). Given that 
the Markov blanket formulation for a pebble is possible, it follows that internal pebble states 
are conditionally independent of external states in virtue of the Markov blanket states.  
The problem therefore is as follows. Under the FEP, the mere presence of a Markov blanket 
implies that internal states can be understood as if they minimise the free energy over the 
states that make up their Markov blanket. Technically, since minimising free energy is the 
same as performing approximate Bayesian inference, it follows that one can associate the 
internal pebble states (and its blanket states) with Bayesian inference. Yet, what is sauce for 
the goose is sauce for the gander. That is, if (1) anything that exists over time has a Markov 
blanket which implies that expected free energy is minimized and can be cast as engaging in 
Bayesian inference, and (2) pebbles exist, then (3) pebbles will have a Markov blanket, 
whose dynamics will (minimally) appear as if they engage in Bayesian inference. The 
formalisms of the FEP therefore seem too general to cut any interesting joints between the 
abiotic and biotic — joints one would want to be able to cut in order to unify theorizing about 
life and mind.  
4 Autonomy meets pebble 
The pebble challenge need not be a knockdown argument against the ambitions of the FEP to 
address biology and cognitive science. Here we consider a possible reply to it. Our agenda 
will be to introduce the notion of ​autonomy​ from enactive philosophy of cognitive science.  8
Kirchhoff et al. (2018) appeal to this notion in order to distinguish between ​mere active 
inference ​and ​adaptive active inference​.  The former can be shown to apply to abiotic 9
systems such as pebbles (from above) and the generalised synchrony induced in coupled 
pendulum dynamics. Adaptive active inference is introduced to make sense of the idea that 
living organisms are able to actively change or modulate their sensorimotor coupling to their 
8 Autonomy is a central theoretical construct of the enactive approach to life and mind (Varela, 1979; Varela et 
al., 1991; Thompson 2007; Di Paolo & Thompson 2014; Di Paolo et al. 2017). Enactivism is a theoretical 
framework with roots in theoretical biology, dynamic systems theory, and phenomenology. In enactivism, the 
notion of autonomy as operational closure has received special attention in attempting to unearth the 
self-organisational dynamics essential to life. Yet the literature so far has fallen short of construing operational 
closure in terms of the FEP’s conceptual toolkit. Here we will make a first attempt at conceiving of an 
operationally closed system as being composed of a network of Markov blanketed systems that stand in a 
mutually enabling relation to one another. 
9 There is another notion of autonomy present in the FEP literature, which comprises the internal and the active 
states (Friston, Wiese, Hobson 2020). These are considered autonomous because they are, by definition, 
independent of direct influence from external states. This does not aid in distinguishing abiotic from biotic 
systems, as any system that exists can be described as having a Markov blanket and therefore internal and active 
states, including our pebble discussed in Section 3. 
9 
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environment - which is needed to actively monitor and predict changes to perturbations that 
challenge homeostatic variables, which may, sometimes, go out of bounds. However, the 
modulation of sensorimotor coupling is merely a (contingent) feature of an autonomous 
system. Operational closure and precariousness jointly define autonomy. We build on 
Kirchhoff et al’s (2018; see also Kirchhoff & Froese 2017) argument by showing how 
autonomy is underwritten by the concepts of operational closure and precariousness (cf. Di 
Paolo & Thompson 2014).  
4.1 Operational closure and precariousness 
Operational closure is central to the conceptualisation of autonomy (Di Paolo & Thompson 
2014). It is characterized as a form of ​organization​ in the sense that it specifies the particular 
way any system’s component parts are organized in relation to one another. By specifying the 
organized ‘unity’ (the system) via this formalism, we also implicitly define its environment. 
Furthermore, by defining the system and its environment, we also specify the boundary 
through which the system interacts with its environment (Beer 2004, 2014; Maturana and 
Varela, 1980). 
A system is operationally closed if the processes that make up the system constitute what is 
known as a self-enabling network. It is empirically possible to determine whether any 
particular system is operationally closed by mapping out the causal processes relevant for the 
system and how they relate to one another. In particular, one must look for ​enabling​ relations. 
On the one hand, process A can be said to ‘enable’ process B if the continuation of A is partly 
or wholly constitutive of the continuation of B. This does not exclude the possibility of 
another process C also partly constitutive of the continuation of B. On the other hand, process 
B is ‘enabled by’ process A if the continuation of B is partly or wholly constituted by the 
continuation of A, which also does not exclude a possible process C that is mutually 
constitutive of the continuation of B. A still counts as enabling B if, say, B would continue 
without A as long as C is in place. A also still counts as enabling B if, say, B would only 
continue as long as both A and C are in place. That is to say, an enabling relation need not be 
necessary nor sufficient for the continuation of the enabled process. In mapping out the 
enabling relations between the different processes present in the system, one may find a 
self-enabling network of processes in which each process enables and is enabled by at least 
one other process in the network. A system only counts as operationally closed if such a 
self-enabling network can be identified (Di Paolo and Thompson 2014). One can imagine a 
set of processes A, B, C, D, and E, so that A enables B, B enables C, C enables both A and D, 
D does not enable any process in the ABCD system, and finally, E enables A. In this case, A, 
B and C form a self-enabling network that enables but is not enabled by external process D, 
and is enabled by but does not enable process E. See Figure 2 for a schematic illustration of 
the operationally closed system here described (Di Paolo and Thompson 2014). 
10 
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Figure 2​, a diagram displaying an operationally closed network of enabling 
relations. Each node in the figure represents a process in the network, and each 
arrow represents an enabling relation. The operationally closed network is 
marked by the black nodes; processes outside the operationally closed system 
are marked in grey. Each node that is part of the operationally closed network 
is marked by having at least one outgoing and one incoming arrow from 
another node in the operationally closed network as is described in-text 
(inspired by Di Paolo and Thompson 2014). 
 
Precariousness signifies a natural inclination to decline. In Figure 2 above, for example, 
process A is precarious if it would cease were it not enabled by E and C. It may be that not 
each enabling process is ​per se​ necessary or sufficient in enabling. If A is precarious, this 
does mean however, that jointly, its enablers are both necessary and sufficient for the 
continuation of A. As each node in the network is precarious, the network itself is too. This is 
crucial for the notion of autonomy in the enactive approach (Di Paolo 2005). 
A paradigmatic case that displays operational closure and precariousness is a single cell. A 
cell is constituted by a complex network of interrelated causal processes, but, for didactic 
purposes, we distinguish three. The first process comprises the metabolic network. The 
second process is the membrane-generation of the cell that separates the network from the 
environment. The third process consists of the active regulation of matter and energy 
exchanges of the cell, via the membrane-induced barrier, with its external environment. By 
way of this third process, the system can absorb nutrients from and expel wastes into its 
environment to continue its metabolism, looping back into process one. 
The metabolic network, process 1, can be divided into subprocesses. A central aspect of 
metabolism is the production of enzymes, which exhibits a form of closure in itself. Enzymes 
are precarious. As such, when particular enzymes need to be produced, this occurs “in 
metabolic pathways helped by other enzymes, which in turn are produced with the 
participation of other ones … in a ​recursive ​way” (Mossio and Moreno 2010, p. 278, 
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emphasis added). That is, the metabolic network in itself can be said to be “enzymatically 
closed” (Mossio and Moreno 2010, p. 278). This production network enables process 2: the 
generation of a membrane that separates the network from its environment. This 
semipermeable barrier is necessary for the system to actively regulate its exchanges with the 
environment. It both allows the system to take in matter and energy from the environment, 
and protect its internal network from external perturbation of the metabolism (Ruiz-Mirazo 
and Mavelli 2008; Thompson 2007). The exchange with the environment enabled by the 
barrier’s separation is process 3. The limited openness is exploited to allow for the absorption 
of nutrients from the environment which can stimulate the maintenance of the membrane 
itself, but also “contribute to the production of an ‘energy currency’” (Ruiz-Mirazo and 
Mavelli 2008, 376; Skulachev, 1992). Via trans-membrane mechanisms, this ‘currency’ is 
cashed out in internal metabolic reactions, transformed to serve as energy resources to 
maintain and actively regulate its boundary conditions (Ruiz-Mirazo, Mavelli 2008). This is 
to say that process 3 loops back into enabling process 1 and 2. These enabling relations are 
visualized in Figure 3 below. Here we can see that operational closure and precariousness 
jointly correctly marks a cell as an autonomous system. 
Figure 3​ illustrates the simplified process network relevant to a single cell. 
Process 1, which captures the metabolic network, is represented by the 1 in the 
top-left. Process 2, membrane-generation, is represented by 2 in the top-right. 
Process 3, the active regulation of matter and energy exchanges with the 
environment is represented by 3 in the bottom-right. The environment is 
represented by the E in the bottom-left. The arrows between the represented 
processes stand for enabling relations as described above. We see that 1, 2 and 
3 form a self-enabling network as per the definition above. Each process in the 
network enables and is enabled by at least one other process in the network. 1 
enables 2 and is enabled by 3. 2 enables 3 and is enabled by 1 as well as 3. 3 
enables both 1 and 2, and is enabled by 2 and E. The network here described 
thus represents an operationally closed system. 
4.2 Autonomy and the pebble 
A pebble is not autonomous. Given that autonomy is intended to solve the pebble challenge, 
it is important to subject the pebble to the same analysis: is a pebble operationally closed and 
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precarious? If not, this indicates that autonomy as used here is an adequate concept to 
distinguish between abiotic and biotic systems. We distinguish four causal processes that are 
relevant to the formation and maintenance of the pebble’s structural integrity on a shingle 
beach, two of which are directly considered to be determinants of a pebble’s shape and size: 
particle abrasion and particle transport. These two processes may be more or less relevant 
depending on the particular geological location (Domokos and Gibbons 2012; see also 
Landon, 1930; Kuenen, 1964; Carr, 1969; Bluck, 1967). Particle transport refers to the 
transport of the pebble by the river. Particle abrasion refers to the collusion with other 
pebbles (and other materials) that occurs primarily during particle transport. The remaining 
two processes are the fluid flows of the river and the environment that consists of abraders of 
a hard enough consistency to allow for particle abrasion. 
The four processes in the network are thus: fluid flows (A), environmental abraders (B), 
particle abrasion (C) and particle transport (D). Fluid flows enable particle transport, and can 
reasonably be considered to enable particle abrasion too. Assuming there are no other moving 
objects in the river, the pebble will be unlikely to move from its location and is thus unlikely 
to be abraded by other materials, if it is not swept anywhere by the fluid flows. 
Environmental abraders only enable particle abrasion. Particle abrasion in itself does not 
enable any other process in the network. Particle transport only enables particle abrasion. 
This means that fluid flows only enable other processes, but are themselves not enabled by 
any other process in the network. The enabling relations are specified in Figure 4 below. This 
means that A cannot be part of a self-enabling network. Environmental abraders only enable 
particle abrasion, and are not themselves enabled by other processes in the network and thus 
B suffers the same fate as A. C, particle abrasion, is enabled by all other processes in the 
network, but does not actually enable any other process, and can also not figure in a 
self-enabling network. Process D, particle transport, is the only process that is both enabled 
by and enables another process in the network, being enabled by fluid flows, enabling particle 
abrasion. This enabling chain, however, never loops back into enabling the continuation of 
particle transport. As such, Process D too cannot be part of a self-enabling network. 
Summing it up, there is no self-enabling network to be found in the processual network 
surrounding pebbles. This means that, under the operational closure formalism, pebbles are 
not marked as autonomous.  10
 
10 Our treatment of the pebble case may seem disanalogous with our treatment of the cell case. The discussion of 
the cell case treated a few important ​internal​ processes such as metabolism and membrane-generation next to 
the ​external​ processes concerned with exchanges with the environment. Our take on the pebble case seems to 
lack in internal counterparts to the external processes. This speaks to what the operational closure formalism 
indicates, which is that the pebble simply is not an operationally closed system. This means that, in terms of this 
formalism, there is no ‘internal’ to speak of that ​could​ operate (semi-)independently of the external processes. 
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Figure 4​ represents the process network relevant to a pebble on a shingle 
beach. The nodes with letters A, B, C and D in the figure represent the 
processes A, B, C, and D mentioned in-text respectively. The arrows represent 
enabling relations so that the arrow going down from A to C means that A 
enables C. Each node is coloured gray to indicate that the network is not 
operationally closed, as no process except for D enables and is enabled by at 
least one other process in the network. The network can thus not be said to be 
self-enabling. 
 
5 Autonomy meets Markov blanket 
Operational closure and precariousness provide the principled distinction between 
autonomous and non-autonomous systems. It is this distinction that is difficult to capture 
within the Markov blanket formalism of the FEP. If the FEP is to account for the 
self-organizational dynamics essential to life, there is good reason to attempt to incorporate 
the notion of operational closure into the FEP (Kirchhoff et al. 2018; Palacios et al. 2020).  
5.1 On self-individuation 
A system is considered operationally closed only if it exhibits a network of self-enabling 
processes. That is, each process in the network enables and is enabled by at least one other 
process in the network. This means that any operationally closed system is inherently 
composed of multiple individually distinguishable component processes. Taken together, 
these individually distinguishable component processes form a larger network that 
self-individuates​, and generates its own boundary between itself and its environment. The 
Markov blanket formalism is well-equipped to capture this hierarchical boundary generation 
of processes (Palacios et al. 2020). If we take each component process to have a Markov 
blanket, and the larger, operationally closed network to have a Markov blanket too, the 
generation of a self-enabling and self-individuating process network can be cast as the 
hierarchical self-organization of a Markov blanketed ensemble of Markov blankets. Palacios 
et al. (2020) show how, with a few crucial assumptions, single cells can be shown to 
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aggregate quite naturally into a larger ensemble. In this particular way, we can consider each 
node of the network to be Markov blanketed, and the ensemble-network to be Markov 
blanketed in itself, as shown in Figure 5 below. The nodes of the operationally closed 
network need not be operationally closed themselves, which means that the nodes themselves 
need not invite being divided further into another layered network. We can thus ground 
operational closure in terms of Markov blanket ensembles without inviting an infinite regress. 
This maps onto a single cell organism too. Consider that each organelle of a single cell can be 
distinguished statistically from the rest of the cell, thus establishing a Markov blanket 
(Palacios et al. 2020), without in itself being operationally closed and thus not in itself 
requiring to be composed of a self-enabling process network under the current definition of 
operational closure. 
Figure 5 describes the operationally closed single cell system with a Markov 
blanket around the ensemble of process networks that make up the system. The 
process relations described are just as they were in Figure (x: cell). The circle 
around the self-enabling network of 1, 2 and 3 represents the Markov blanket 
around the ensemble. 
Although this captures a key feature of operational closure, self-individuation (or 
membrane-generation in terms of a single biotic cell), it falls short of accounting for the 
conditional enabling network that differentiates autonomous from non-autonomous systems. 
Hierarchical self-organization is only part of the enactive story of autonomy. Indeed, the 
pebble challenge could be reformulated as a ​shingle beach challenge​ so that the beach can be 
cast as an ensembled Markov blanketed system that engages in Bayesian inference, 
composed of individually Markov blanketed pebbles. The distinction between abiotic and 
biotic thus remains blurred, even in a hierarchical perspective. 
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5.2 On operational closure and enabling relations 
There are a few differences between just any Markov blanketed system and an operationally 
closed Markov blanketed system that we need to capture. Operational closure is a particularly 
structured​ manner of self-organization (Maturana and Varela, 1980). Increased structure over 
time implies that the long term entropy (informally a measure of disorder; Friston 2013) is 
low, which means that sensory surprise must be low too. The ensemble’s states are 
constituted by the component states, which means that the component states inherit this low 
surprise. This is a key aspect of understanding operational closure in the FEP. 
We can exploit the lower surprise internal to the network further by, for the sake of 
exposition, ignoring the system’s environment. For each particular node, its sensory states are 
entirely determined by the active states of the other nodes in the network (Palacios et al. 
2020). More specifically, if A enables B, that means that the active states of A must have an 
important influence on B, which in turn means that the active states of A are significantly 
determinant of the sensory states of B. Conversely, if B is enabled only by A, its sensory 
states are entirely determined by the active states of A. This means that, within the network, 
each node’s sensory states are determined by the active states of its enablers. This implies 
that the sensory surprise of any node is at a nearly absolute minimum, ​given​ the active states 
of the enabling nodes. 
In light of this, an enabling relation is closely related to the notion of ​coupling​. Any two 
nodes can be said to be coupled when they are in a relation of ​mutual ​influence (Friston 
2013). In active inference, the generative models associated with two coupled systems will 
approach one another over time, giving rise to what is known as ​generalized synchrony​. As 
the coupled two systems continuously interact, they become attuned to one another; they 
adapt to one another (Friston 2013). This attunement means that the influence they have on 
one another becomes increasingly well accommodated. In mutual attunement, this entails 
changes in the ​extrinsic ​probability distribution in the state space, so that the sensory states 
associated with the active states of the coupled system are increasingly likely. On the scale of 
the network, this means that the nodes as part of the network, ​i.e. ​on a network-level scale, 
are in a tight coupling relation. This is to say that each node’s influence will enable, and thus 
largely determine, another node’s states that will, by virtue of being part of the network, 
couple back the initial node to enable and largely determine its own states either directly or 
indirectly. An operationally closed network, then, can be taken as a tightly coupled network 
of Markov blanketed nodes.  
Note however, that, ​prima facie​, the notion of coupling is not necessarily applicable to any 
two nodes in an enabling relation within the network. We thus cannot simply transcribe the 
enabling relations between nodes as coupling relations. A coupling relation is ​symmetrical 
insofar it prescribes mutual influence. This does not mean that the interaction needs to be 
identical in both​ directions of influence, but it does imply that the interaction is minimally 
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bidirectional: the active states of one node determine the sensory states of another node ​and 
vice versa​. Taken in this sense of direct influence, an enabling relation is not. An enabling 
relation can be asymmetrical, as we see in nodes 1 and 2 in Figure 5 above. This means that 
we would miss out on asymmetrical enabling relations if we were to transcribe them as 
coupling relations in a model. Moreover, an enabling relation concerns a specific type of 
influence that one node has on another. Consider that any random two systems may, for a 
certain duration over time, be coupled in a mutually ​disruptive​ fashion. This means that rather 
than ​enabling​ one another, they instead ​inhibit​ one another. This distinction too may be lost if 
we were to transcribe enabling relations as coupling relations. Crucially, however, we ​can ​say 
that the individual nodes are at least indirectly coupled to one another from a network 
perspective. 
5.3 On precariousness and limits 
The low sensory surprise of an enabled node, given the active states of enabling nodes may 
also be able to capture an organism’s ​precariousness​. Recall that precariousness appears on 
two levels in an autonomous system. Each process in the network is precarious, and the 
network as a unity is too. Network-level precariousness is built into the FEP at its very core. 
Any system needs to put in work to be able to maintain its boundaries with the environment 
and continue existing. This means that without this work, the system will disintegrate, which 
is to say the system is naturally inclined to cessation, yet remains intact due to the ‘efforts’ of 
the system. In this sense, the organism can be taken as precarious.  
However, this line of thinking invites an unintended implication on the node level. Consider 
that high-probability sensory states are those for which they are largely determined by their 
enablers’ active states. The cessation of a process, further, is associated with leaving expected 
bounds. When a process ceases, its active states will thus by definition leave expected 
bounds. This implies that the sensory states of an enabled node would be highly surprising 
(given its ceasing enabler’s active states) so that it’s likely to enter an unviable state and 
cease as well. This seems to entail that if any random enabling node would cease, the sudden 
increase in sensory surprise for the enabled nodes would sooner or later cause each other 
process in the network to fall like dominoes. After all, their own cessation will cause a spike 
in sensory surprise in the nodes they enable, and so on. As the network is composed only of 
processes that both enable and are enabled by at least one other node in the network, no 
single process will be spared. In certain cases, this is to be expected. Consider our toy 
description of a single cell in Section 4.1 above. If we were to cease any of the processes in 
that network, the entire network would collapse. Each process is essential for the continuation 
of the network. However, this is only a contingent fact of our toy description. As stated 
above, it is not necessary for each enabling process to be individually necessary or sufficient 
for the continuation of the enabled process. Indeed, we know from practice that many 
organisms that have one or more modes of influence impaired find ways to adapt to their new 
situation and compensate for the loss in their interactional repertoire. This flexibility is key in 
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our understanding of life and mind,  yet is orthogonal to the domino effect we find on a 
node-level of description. This shows that, though this approach is able to capture certain 
characteristics, it is not capable of incorporating precariousness on both a network- and a 
node-level of description.  
Further, if we intend to capture the essential organizational dynamics for biotic systems, 
abstracting away the environment misses the point. By defining what something is (the 
system, or the ​unity​), we indirectly define that which it is not (the environment) (Beer 2004; 
Friston 2019). This is exacerbated by the fact that for each intrinsic probability density, there 
is an associated extrinsic probability density that specifies the expected influences of external 
states (Friston, Wiese, Hobson 2020). Even in the presence of an external environment, an 
operationally closed system intrinsically defines its environment as well as its boundary 
through which it can interact with the environment (Beer 2004 2014; Friston 2012). In an 
ecological situation, any one node’s surprise is thus not at nearly absolute minimum, but can 
still be said to be ​particularly​ low, given the active states of its enablers. 
In sum, we have presented some ways to consider conceptualizing operational closure and 
precariousness in terms of a tightly coupled network of Markov blankets. There is a sense in 
which tightly bound network-scale coupling, and particularly low sensory surprise of enabled 
nodes given the active states of enabling nodes, can capture operational closure and 
precariousness. This can be taken as a proof of concept. Further simulational research may 
aid further in the incorporation of autonomy into the FEP by putting the approach here to 
work. 
Conclusion 
The FEP sports a grand unifying ambition to account for a wide variety of phenomena, 
among others the organizational dynamics of living and cognitive systems. This makes the 
pebble challenge cut at the core of the FEP research programme: if it cannot cut any 
interesting joints between biotic and abiotic systems, the FEP cannot connect to real 
biological systems in any interesting way. We addressed this worry by elaborating on earlier 
suggestions to incorporate the enactive notion of autonomy into the FEP framework. In 
Section 4, we described how operational closure and precariousness are concepts fit to handle 
the pebble challenge. In the subsequent section, we made a first attempt at incorporating the 
enactive language of autonomy into free energy language. We discuss different aspects of 
autonomy in the enactive approach and how they could potentially be transcribed into the 
FEP formalism. The FEP quite naturally accounts for self-individuation, a corollary of 
operational closure. The enabling relation central to operational closure proves more 
challenging. There are implications with regards to the statistical relations between nodes for 
any operationally closed system such as an enabled node’s low sensory surprise in light of its 
enablers’ active states that we show the FEP can account for. The FEP can thus emulate a 
18 
This is a pre-print. This paper is currently under review. 
limited version of autonomy as it appears in the enactive approach. There remain some loose 
ends however. As pointed out in Section 5.3, precariousness remains difficult to incorporate 
on a node-level, and the complexity of an ecological environment places limits on 
surprise-minimization descriptions as leveraged in Section 5.2. Simulation modeling can 
further help incorporate this notion of autonomy into the FEP formalism.  
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